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State of New Jersey v. Michaels: The Due Process
Implications Raised in Interviewing Child Witnesses
I. INTRODUCTION
The crime of sexual abuse of children has increasingly become an alarming
social problem. This fact is affirmed by a rising number of sexual abuse
prosecutions nationally and the recent focus on the subject by legal experts. But
in zealous attempts to punish the individuals who perpetrate such heinous crimes,
prosecutors often seek convictions of defendants who may have been wrongfully
accused. Remembering that the victims of these crimes are children is crucial.
Their mental processes are not yet fully developed, and they can be easily
influenced to believe what others want them to believe. This pliancy, at the
hands of investigators, can be devastating to a defendant in a criminal sexual
abuse prosecution. The prosecution can, and often does, elicit incriminating
statements from child witnesses and can use them to convict the defendant,
regardless of the truth of such statements. The focus, therefore, must be on the
interview techniques used by the state's agents, as in the decision of State v.
Michaels.' Indeed, the interview techniques that were employed in Michaels led
to the reversal of a conviction.
This comment will suggest that constitutional due process protections should
be extended to child interviews. That is, defendants accused of sexual abuse of
children should be given extra, "last-resort"2 due process protection.' The stage
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1. 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994).
2. This idea of due process as a "last-resort" protection for defendants stems from the
applicaton of the "incorporation doctrine." Simply stated, incorporation is the process through which
the Supreme Court has made most of the Bill of Rights guarantees of the United States Constitution
applicable to the states. At this point, the Court has given virtually all of the guarantees relating to
criminal procedure to defendants in state court proceedings, through "selective incorporation." This
method of incorporation did not automatically institute all Bill of Rights guarantees into state
proceedings, but rather only those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all of our civil and political institutions." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328, 58 S. Ct. 149,
153 (1937). Thus, a state criminal defendant will initially claim that his Bill of Rights guarantees,
essentially his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights, have been violated, since they are
specifically applicable to state court proceedings. Upon a denial of protection based on those asserted
rights, the defendant may then fall back on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to claim that his right to a fair trial has been violated.
3. Interviews alone should not trigger a due process implication. It is only when the state
attempts to introduce evidence from such interviews that the clause becomes applicable. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted:
[u]nlike a warrantless search, which may violate a constitutionally protected interest in
privacy, the identification of a suspect-whether fair or unfair-does not necessarily affect
any constitutionally protected interest of the suspect. The Due Process Clause applies
only to proceedings which result in a deprivation of life, liberty or property. The due
process issue, therefore, does not arise until testimony about the showup--or perhaps
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of the prosecution in which incriminating evidence is obtained from witness
interviews certainly warrants constitutional protections, no less than interrogations
of the accused or witness identifications. Pretrial interviews provide prosecutors
with an opportunity to infect the entire proceeding through unfair and unscrupu-
lous processes.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
defendant like a procedural "guardian angel," ensuring he receives a fair trial.
Yet, confusion may still exist concerning what form of protection the clause
offers to a defendant. In an excellent statement of the scope of due process
protections, the United States Supreme Court has explained, in a comprehensive
manner, how the clause has traditionally worked in a criminal setting:
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to
observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence
of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be
of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.'
With this concept in mind, this comment will show how the procedures used
against the accused in Michaels violated her "fundamental fairness" rights and
how the Due Process Clause could be used to deter this behavior in the future.
A process must be adopted by courts in which the unfair practices surrounding
interviews with child witnesses are eliminated, yet the interest of the nation's
criminal justice system in prosecuting child abusers is maintained.
II. THE CASE
A. Factual Setting and the Lower Courts' Decisions
Due to the bizarre and unthinkable allegations made by the State of New
Jersey, the criminal prosecution of Kelly Michaels was one of intense public
scrutiny and emotion. The defendant was a college student who took a job at a
daycare center, with the intention of it being only temporary while in pursuit of
an acting career' Michaels had no prior experience as a teacher, yet worked for
a seven-month period at Wee Care Day Nursery to the satisfaction of her
obtained as ia result of the showup-is offered at the criminal trial. If that evidence is
unfairly prejudicial, the trial judge may have a constitutional obligation to exclude it, or
possibly to mitigate its impact by an appropriate cautionary instruction to the jury. But
if a constitutional violation results from a showup, it occurs in the courtroom, not in the
police station.
United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016, 95
S. Ct. 2424 (1975). This concept also applies to police procedures used before trial in obtaining
evidence through investigatory interviews.
4. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236. 62 S. Ct. 280, 290 (1941).
5. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1374.
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employer." She was assigned to a classroom in the basement that was separated
from adjacent classrooms by a single vinyl curtain. One of Michaels' responsi-
bilities was to supervise approximately twelve children during their "nap time"
in this classroom. For seven months, no complaints were received regarding
Michaels' job performance or personal behavior from any of her supervisors, co-
workers, students, or parents of students. A single statement, however, from one
four-year-old student made on the day of Michaels' resignation from Wee Care,
led to an Essex County investigation that would eventually produce three
indictments totaling over 230 counts of alleged sexual abuse of Wee Care
children.' After Michaels had been sentenced to forty-seven years in prison by
the trial court, she appealed to the Superior Court, challenging the propriety of
the prosecutors' behavior in investigating the complaint. Indeed, after a reversal
of her conviction, this was the sole issue presented by the state to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.
As in most cases of sexual abuse, the key witnesses in the Michaels case
were the alleged victims-children between the ages of three and six. The
investigators had few other leads to pursue in prosecuting Michaels: other staff
members were completely unaware of any misconduct, and the state introduced
only limited physical or medical evidence of abuse." Thus, prosecutors had only
the alleged child victims and Michaels herself from whom to extract crucial
incriminating evidence. A nine-hour interview with Michaels resulted in a strong
denial and a consensual polygraph test which indicated she was not lying.'
The investigators then commenced extensive interviews with the Wee Care
children. These interviews, the subject of the future Michaels controversy,
culminated in accounts by the children of a wide variety of sexual abuses
committed by Kelly Michaels, "rang[ing] from relatively minor accounts of
6. Id. at 1374.
7. Id. at 1374.
8. Id. at 1375. The statement made by the student was at his pediatrician's office while his
temperature was being taken rectally. The student stated, in the presence of his mother and a nurse,
"this is what my teacher does to me at nap time at school." Id. at 1374. Upon questioning by the
nurse and his mother, the boy identified his teacher as Michaels and added that not only did she
undress him and take his temperature daily, but also did the same to one of his classmates. The
mother notified the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, who, in turn, notified the
Essex County Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 1375.
9. Id. at 1375; see also State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. 1993), affd, 642 A.2d
1372 (1994): "Testing at the Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratories of a wooden spoon and
piano benches for inculpatory evidence proved negative." 625 A.2d at 496. Also, the Appellant's
Brief noted that "[n]ot only did Wee Care and church personnel suspect nothing, no physical or
medical signs of abuse could substantiate the allegations. No parent, during the time that Ms.
Michaels was at Wee Care, ever suspected something was amiss, nor did any report cuts, bruises, or
other physical manifestations of abuse to a pediatrician. No parent during this period noticed any
traces of peanut butter or jelly, or detected the odor of human waste, on a child ...." Brief for
Appellant at 6, State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. 1993), affd., 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994)
(No. 199-88T4).
10. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1375.
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touching to virtually incomprehensible heinous and bizarre acts."" Some
children went so as far as to allege Michaels performed some of the acts in the
presence of other adults. Some claimed they had told their parents as the events
occurred. 2 Again, the investigation was the first news, to both the staff
members and parents, of any such allegations of abuse. Nonetheless, the
prosecutors were convinced they had obtained the evidence needed to convict
Michaels. The trial jury was similarly convinced. 3
On appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
Michaels contended "the questioning of Wee Care Children was so suggestive
and coercive that they were rendered incompetent to testify." 4 The Superior
Court found not only the questioning of the children but also the entire interview
surroundings displayed tactics strongly disfavored by child psychologists and
other academicians. 5 The court reversed the conviction on other prejudicial
errors,' 6 but held that, if the state desired to retry the case, a pretrial factual
hearing would be required to ascertain the effects of the improper interrogation
techniques upon the reliability of the children's statements. 7 If the procedures
used were found to compromise their reliability, then the statements would be
inadmissible at trial.'" The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted a motion by
the state for reconsideration of this specific holding.
B. New Jersey Supreme Court Decision
In considering the necessity of a pretrial hearing, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey focused exclusively on the conduct of the state's interviewers. More
specifically, the court faced the issue of "whether the interview techniques
employed by the State could have undermined the reliability of the children's
statements and subsequent testimony, to the point that a hearing should be held
to determine whether either form of evidence should be admitted at trial.' 9
Having this sole issue presented for consideration, the court consulted the vast
11. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 495-96. There were accounts of Michaels inserting eating utensils
into rectums, penises, and vaginas of children. Some students said she played the piano while nude,
and others accused her of defecating on the floor. There were also allegations of intercourse, fellatio,
cunnilingus, and nude "pile-up games." Id.
12. Id. at 495-96.
13. Michaels was convicted at trial on 115 counts related to the sexual abuse of the children,
including aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of children, and terroristic
threats.. She was sentenced to forty-seven years in prison. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1375.
14. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 493.
15. Id. at 510-16.
16. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed Michaels' conviction on
the following grounds: (1) certain expert testimony of a child psychologist was found inadmissible;
and (2) certain in-chamber proceedings conducted by the trial judge removed the bench from the
required level of impartiality. See Michaels, 625 A.2d at 496-502, 505-08.
17. Id. at 516-17.
18. Id. at 516.
19. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1375 (N.J. 1994).
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scholarly authority on the weaknesses of children as witnesses and the effects
that disfavored interview techniques have on these witnesses. °
The court noted that child witnesses had not received excessive special
attention in the past; that they are not, as a class, to be treated as inferior
witnesses; that age, per se, is not determinative of the ability of a witness; and
that children are able to give accurate accounts of sexual abuse in certain
cases.2' Despite this equal treatment, the court recognized that child sexual
abuse cases are inherently suspect, unless special consideration is given to ensure
the child witnesses are not unduly influenced by investigators.2 This special
consideration stems from the generally accepted notion that children's minds and
psyches are not as fully-developed as adults',2Y As a result, children are more
easily influenced by authority figures, often leading to a reshaping of events in
a child's mind from what he initially believed to be true. Because of such
suggestibility,24 the court noted several elements that indicate influenced
statements from a child witness.' Among the more important factors listed
were: lack of objectivity by the interviewer (bias against the accused); use of
leading questions; lack of control of outside influences on the child; vilification
or criticism of the accused; and use of repeated questions, bribes, threats,
rewards, praise, and peer pressure. The court recognized the academic, judicial,
and governmental authorities on the subject that disfavor these same tech-
niques.2 Thus, the court concluded a strict review of the Michaels interroga-
tion procedures was necessary to ensure that the witnesses' recollections were not
distorted into producing unreliable and inadmissible evidence. 7
20. Id. at 1379. The court consulted "academic, professional, and law enforcement" sources
and cited its previous decisions to obtain the proper authority on the subject.
21. Id. at 1376.
22. Id. at 1376.
23. See generally Jean Montoya, Somithing Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction:
The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 927 (1993); Lucy S. McGough, Child
Witnesses: Fragile Voices in the American Legal System (1994); Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged
Molestation Victim, the Rules of Evidence, and the Constitution: Should Children Really be Seen and
Not Heard?, 14 Am. J. Crim. L. 227 (1987); Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the
Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 Psychol. Bull. 403 (1993); Julie A. Dale,
Ensuring Reliable Testimony from Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases: Applying Social Science
Evidence to a New Fact-Finding Method, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 187 (1993).
24. Suggestibility is one's susceptibility to suggestion, which is defined as "presentation of an
idea, especially indirectly, as through association of ideas, bringing before the mind for consideration,
action, solution, or the like. It is in the nature of a hint or insinuation, and lacks the element of
probability. Facts which merely suggest do not raise an inference of the existence of the fact
suggested, and therefore a suggestion is much less than an inference or presumption." Black's Law
Dictionary 1433 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 (citing Diana Younts, Evaluating andAdmitting Expert Opinion
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 Duke L.J. 691, 729-30, 730-31 (1991); John E.
B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and
Impeachment, 18 Pac. L.J. 801, 885-89 (1987)).
26. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377-78.
27. Id. at 1378-79.
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Turning to a factual analysis of the Wee Care interviews, the court found
textbook examples of what the cited authorities had vehemently condemned.
Indeed, the court previewed the prosecution's downfall early in its opinion when
it stated that "[t]he interrogations undertaken in the course of this case utilized
most, if not all, of the practices that are disfavored or condemned by experts, law
enforcement authorities and government agencies."2
First, the court noted that the large majority of the incriminating statements
made by the children were not the products of "spontaneous recollections" or
"free recall," which are found by courts to be most reliable and accurate.29
Further, none of the children provided any specific details, although the
prosecutors repeatedly tried to elicit them.3 ° A lack of interviewer objectivity
was also found. The interviewing agents failed "to pursue any alternate
hypothesis that might contradict an assumption of defendant's guilt," and failed
"to challenge or probe seemingly outlandish statements made by the children." 31
The prosecutors also asked the children leading questions3 2-those "that contain
a suggestion of what the answer should be. 33 A large majority of the children
interviewed were asked questions phrased as if the sexual misconduct actually
occurred, instead of questions designed to have the children describe events in
their own words.34 In addition, investigators had subjected the children to
repeated and incessant questioning on the same subject, even after the children
expressed their desire to end the interview or to not answer the specific question
posed.35 The record also included instances of threats, bribes, scolding, praise,
28. Id. at 1379.
29. Id. at 1379 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826-27, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3152 (1990);
State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 515 (N.J. Super. 1993), aff'd, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994)).
30. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379.
31. Id. at 1379-80.
32. Id. at 1380.
33. John B. Myers, Legal Issues in Child Abuse and Neglect 55 (1992).
34. For example, consider the following excerpt given in the Appendix of the court's decision:
Investigator (I): Did she put the fork in your butt? Yes or no?
P.I. (child witness): I don't know, I forgot.
(I): You forgot? O.K. Did she do anything else to your bottom?
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1388. Also, consider the following, from the Amicus Brief for the defense:
Q: Did you ever see Kelly have blood in her vagina?
A: This is blood.
Q: Kelly had blood in her vagina.
A: Yeah.
Q: She did? Did you ever get any of that blood on your penis?
A: No. Green blood.
Q: Did you ever see any of your friends get blood on their penis from her vagina?
A: Not green blood but red blood.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 7-8.
35. For example, consider the following excerpt:
Investigator (1): If what you tell me goes along with what they [other children] said, then
I know they were all telling the truth. You know what I mean, jellybean.
B.M. (child witness): I want to leave.-Now!
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rewards, and the use of peer pressure by the interviewers.36 Finally, the
(1): Did you ever go in the music room? The room with the big black piano?
B.M.: No.
(1): Did you ever see Kelly play Jingle Bells on the piano?
B.M.: No.
(I): How did she look when she was sitting at the piano?
B.M.: I never saw her play the piano.
(1): Did she look like this when she was sitting at the piano?
B.M.: No.
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1391. Also, consider the following:
(I): What was it that she did to you?
P.I.: I hate you. I hate you.
(I): Oh, come on, if you just answer that you can go.
P.I.: I hate you.
(1): No you don't.
P.I.: Yes I do.
(1): You love me I can tell. Is that all she did to you, what did she do to your hiney?
(12): What did she do to your hiney? Then you can go.
P.I.: I forgot.
(12): Tell me what Kelly did to your hiney and then you can go. If you tell me what she
did to your hiney we'll let you go.
P.1.: No.
(1): Please.
P.I.: O.K. O.K. O.K.
(I): Tell me now.
P.I.: O.K.
(1): What did Kelly do to your hiney?
P.l.: I'll try to remember.
(1): What did she put in your hiney?
P.l.: The fork.
(1): Did that hurt a lot? Did you bleed?
P.I.: Nope. -
Id. at 1388.
36. Id. at 1380. Consider the following comments made by the interviewers:
(I): Don't be a baby. You're acting like a nursery school kid. Come here. Come here
a second. B.M., come here. We're not finished yet. Sit down.
(I): Come on do you want to help us out? Do you want to help us keep her (Kelly) in
jail?
(1): I'll let you hear your voice and let you play with the tape recorder. I need your help
again, buddy. Come on.
P.1.: No.
(1): Just tell me--show me what happened with the wooden spoon. Let's go.
P.1.: I forgot.
(1): No you didn't. I'll tell you what, let's just go to the P.I. doll, we won't waste any
time.
(12): Now listen you have to behave.
(): Do you want me to tell him to behave?
(12): Are you going to be a good boy? Huh? You have to be good. Yes or no?
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interviewing team engaged in "vilification"-criticism and condemnation-of
P.I.: Yes.
(I): I talked to all of [the kids in your class] and they were telling me stuff Kelly was
doing. Anyway I like talking to you older guys better because you're better to talk to,
more like grownups than the little kids in the nursery school. So I'm asking you a
favor-
(I): That's o.k. ... Believe me she is not going to be coming out of jail. She's not
going to be hurting you guys anymore. That's why I'm really proud of you, and E.N. and
L.J....
(I): I'd hate having to tell your friends that you didn't want to help them.
Id. at 1387-91. Also, consider the following excerpt from the Appellant's Brief:
(I): 8C (child witness), come on. Don't be so unfriendly. I thought we were buddies last
time.
(8C): Nope, not any more...
(I): We have gotten a lot of other kids to help us since I last saw you.
(8C): No, I don't have to.
(I): Oh, come on. Did we tell you that Kelly is in jail?
(8C): Yes. My mother already told me.
(I): Did I tell you that this is the guy that arrested her? This is the guy that put her there.
Did I tell you that? ... Well, we can get out of here real quick if you just tell me what
you told me last time, when we met the last time.
(8C): I forgot.
(I): No, you didn't. I know you didn't.
(8C): I did, I did!
(I): Naw, come on!
(8C): I forgot.
(I): ... I thought we were friends last time.
(8C): I'm not your friend anymore!
(I): How come?
(8C): Because I hate you!
(I): You have no reason to hate me. We were buddies when you left.
(8C): I hate you now!
(I): Let's get done with this quick so we could go to Kings and get your popsicles. Sit
down before you fall. Come on, just a couple of more minutes... Real quick, will you
just tell me [or show me] what happened with the wooden spoon? Let's go.
(8C): I forgot.
(1): I'll tell you what, let's just go to the SC doll. We won't waste any time.
(12): Now listen, you have to behave.
(I): Do you want me to tell him to behave? Are you going to be a good boy. Huh?
While you are here, did he [12] show you his badge and his handcuffs?... Back to what
happened to you with the wooden spoon. If you don't remember words, maybe you can
show me.
(8C):' I forgot what happened too.
(1): You remember. You told your mommy about everything: about the music room and
the nap room and all that stuff. You want to help her stay in jail don't you? So she
doesn't bother you anymore and so she doesn't tell you any more scary stories...
Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 86-87.
NOTES
Michaels and failed to control the amount of outside influence presented to the
children by their parents or classmates.37
Normally, remote and sporadic examples of the type of interview techniques
as employed by the New Jersey prosecutors would not have invoked such a strict
review. In Michaels, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
interviews of the children were highly improper and employed coercive and
unduly suggestive methods. As a result, a substantial likelihood exists that the
children's recollection of past events was both stimulated and materially
influenced by that course of questioning.""
The court very briefly took notice of its judicial duty of ensuring that
evidence admitted at trial is reliable, recognizing the due process rights of the
defendant.39 The court stated "[i]f crucial inculpatory evidence is alleged to
have been derived from unreliable sources due process interests are at risk."'
This suggestion is both logical and convincing. The Due Process Clause should
preserve the guarantee of fundamental fairness to all defendants, regardless of the
manner of evidence collection. The court in Michaels, however, did not expound
further on its claim of possible due process implications in cases of improper
interrogations of child witnesses. The reversal of Michaels' conviction was not
on the basis of a due process violation, and thus the court created confusion as
to whether a constitutional claim would in fact have been viable. Also, the
court's dependence on a famous decision of the United-States Supreme Court
involving pretrial identifications, Manson v. Brathwaite,4' was a bit unsettling.
This reference to Manson was correct in citing a rule requiring reliability of
testimony, but the court truncated its reasoning too soon. The court did not
address the issue of how the Manson rule, which requires identification testimony
to be reliable, can be applied to a non-identification problem as that of Michaels.
Unlike the Manson decision, Michaels dealt with evidence of guilt or innocence,
and not the mere identification of the accused. The court failed to provide
sufficient justification for making the analogy, although it is reasonable. This
analogy, however, can be supported.
After merely suggesting due process protections were at stake, the court then
affirmed the appellate court's remedy of a pretrial reliability assessment, should
the state decide to retry the case. The justification for such a hearing was found
in prior New Jersey and United States Supreme Court decisions.42 The court
noted that when "police or prosecutorial conduct has thrown the integrity of the
37. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. Since the series of interviews occurred over several months,
the children were free to discuss the questioning sessions with others.
38. Id. at 1380.
39. Id. at 1380.
40. Id. at 1380.
41. 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
42. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381 (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253; Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964); State v. Gookins, 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994); State
v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (N.J. 1981); State v. Sugas, 417 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1980)).
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judicial process into question, we have not hesitated to use the procedural
protection of a pretrial hearing to cleanse a potential prosecution from the
corrupting effects of tainted evidence."'43 The court again referenced the
Manson-line of decisions to show the similarities between suggestive identifica-
tion procedures and pretrial investigatory interviews, but again did not base its
holding on due process implications. The court cited United States v. Wade,'
reasoning that both pretrial identifications and investigatory interviews are critical
stages of a prosecution because they are "riddled with innumerable dangers and
variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair
trial."'45 Because of the overlapping dangers presented, the court validated the
requirement of the pretrial hearing, just as in suggestive identification prosecu-
tions. Indeed, the court found the Michaels case to be even more deserving of
a reliability assessment. 6
Assuming the state chose to re-prosecute Michaels, the court stressed a need
to consider all relevant facts to determine reliability.47 The court identified
several specific factors, especially with regard to children, which had a bearing
on this determination.48 The specific test to be applied if such a hearing arose
was outlined by the court: "whether the pretrial events, the investigatory
interviews and interrogations, were so suggestive that they give rise to a
substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken or false recollection of material
facts bearing on defendant's guilt."49
The court recognized that generally "the initial burden to trigger a pretrial
taint hearing is on the defendant,"5 meaning "[t]he defendant must make a
showing of 'some evidence' that the victim's statements were the product of
suggestive or coercive interview techniques."'" In a particularly strong
43. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1381.
44. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967) (holding that a post-indictment lineup, in which the
accused was to be identified, was a "critical stage" of the prosecution).
45. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382.
46. Id. at 1382. The court stated: "We are confronted in this case with pretrial events relating
not to the identification of an offender but, perhaps more crucially, to the occurrence of the offense
itself." Id.
47. Id. at 1381.
48. Id. at 1381. The factors listed are:
(1) the person to whom the child made the statement; (2) whether the statement was made
under conditions likely to elicit truthftilness; (3) whether the child's recitation exhibits
unusual or above-age-level familiarity with sex or sexual functions; (4) post-event and
post-recitation distress; (5) any physical evidence of abuse; and (6) any congruity between
a defendant's confession or statement.
Id. at 1381 (citing State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1988)). Other factors listed are: "(1) the age
of the victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim's relationship with the interrogator;
and (4) the type of questions asked." Id. at 1381 (citing State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 379 (N.J.
1990)).
49. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383.
50. Id. at 1383.
51. Id. at 1383 (citing Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350, 101 S. Ct. 654, 659-60 (1981)).
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condemnation of the prosecution's tactics, however, the court found Michaels had
met this burden of triggering the need for the hearing. 2 Assuming the state
would go forth with the prosecution, and thus assuming such a hearing would be
held, Michaels would have a second threshold to overcome. Once at the hearing,
Michaels would be required to established "sufficient evidence of unreliability,"
and then the burden of redeeming the evidence would shift to the state. The
state was given a strict burden, "to prove the reliability of the proffered
statements and testimony by clear and convincing evidence." 3 By choosing a
clear and convincing standard, the court provided a threshold sufficient to
"safeguard the fairness of a defendant's trial without .making legitimate
prosecution of child sexual abuse impossible."'
Finally, the court held that, even if some evidence is found to be reliable on
retrial, the duty will then be on the jury to weigh its probative value and
credibility. But, because of the intense disapproval of the prosecution's case, this
instruction may have, in effect, been a rule solely for future cases. Indeed,
almost seven months after the decision, the prosecution in Michaels announced
that it would not go forward in pursuit of a retrial.
Overall, the decision in Michaels provides persuasive authority for other
courts to extend due process protection to alleged child sexual and physical
abusers, although the Due Process Clause was not the specific source of remedy.
The thorough summary of the evidentiary problems involved with respect to
child witnesses is very beneficial. The remainder of this comment will discuss
52. [The] threshold standard has been met with respect to the investigatory interviews and
interrogations that occurred in this case. Without limiting the grounds that could serve
to trigger a taint hearing, we note that the kind of practices used here-the absence of
spontaneous recall, interviewer bias, repeated leading questions, multiple interviews,
incessant questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact with peers and references
to their statements, and the use of threats, bribes and cajoling, as well as the failure to
videotape or otherwise document the initial interview sessions-constitutes more than
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the interrogations created a substantial risk
that the statements and anticipated testimony are unreliable, and therefore justify a taint
hearing.
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1383.
53. Id. at 1383. Because the lack of reliability was already expounded on by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Michaels' duty of shifting the burden to the state at the hearing would have been
slight at best. Then the state would be required to show that the evidence possessed independent
features of reliability strong enough to "outweigh the effects of the improper interview techniques."
Id. at 1383.
54. However, considering the forceful language used, the court may have effectively rendered
a legitimate prosecution impossible. Consider the court's language:
Our decision today should make clear that the investigatory techniques employed by the
prosecution in this case are unacceptable and that prudent prosecutors and investigatory
agencies will modify their investigatory practices to avoid those kinds of errors and to
conform to those standards that are now accepted by the professional and law enforcement
communities.
Id. at 1384. Also, the court stated that "[g]iven the egregious prosecutorial abuses evidenced in this
record, the challenge that the State faces is formidable." Id. at 1385.
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the general concerns with child witnesses in criminal prosecutions and the
constitutional due process implications raised by the Michaels decision.
III. PRE-MICnAEIS AUTHORITY ON THE RELEVANT ISSUES
A. Problems with Child Witnesses
The alarming statistics of child sexual abuse incidents have caused great
social and political concern." Because of an active media frenzy, state
legislatures have moved quickly to increase penalties for such crimes. 6 At first
glance, this increasing recognition and concern appears beneficial in that
authorities now strive to reduce the frequency of the crime. However, as one
commentator recently noted, "an overly emotional response to child sexual abuse
compromises efforts to respond to this serious and widespread social prob-
lem. '57 The overzealous attempts to curb sexual offenses on children suffer
from three significant problems, as it relates to this discussion:
First, because children are developmentally immature, their allegations
of sexual abuse are of limited reliability. Second, most professionals
who interview children employ improper interview techniques that often
lead to false allegations of sexual abuse .... And finally, a consider-
able proportion of the professionals working in the child abuse field are
biased or corrupt.5"
The suggestibility of children's memories has been a topic of much concern
among child psychologists and legal experts, 9 who believe that, due to their
credulousness, children may be easily manipulated to give responses not truly
intended. With this in mind, various interview techniques have been developed
to ensure more reliable testimony from children.
Attention has been drawn also to the various interview techniques either
approved or disapproved as ways of eliciting information from child witnesses.
Again, experts and courts have recognized those techniques that should be
55. See The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1985) [hereinafter Harvard]. This authority asserts that one in
five female and one in eleven male children are sexually abused. Id. at 806 (citing David Finkelhor,
Sexually Victimized Children 53 (1979)).
56. Harvard, supra note 55, at 806.
57. John B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater Objectivity, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1990).
58. Id. at 1711 (citing Hollinda Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Accusations of Sexual Abuse
(1988)).
59. See Younts, supra note 25; Montoya, supra note 23; Feher, supra note 23; "The
Suggestibility of Children's Recollections (John Doris ed., 1991).
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avoided to obtain reliable evidence from child witnesses.'e Such improprieties
associated with child interviews were abundant in the Michaels investigation.6
A third problem, especially in light of the Michaels decision, is interviewer
prejudice. Studies have shown that incidents of inaccurate reports are most
likely to occur when "the interviewer harbor[s] preconceived notions about what
had happened."62 This prejudice is most obvious when the interviewer fails to
suggest any explanations other than the accused's guilt, as in Michaels. Because
of the above mentioned flaws in the judicial framework of child sexual abuse
prosecutions, state legislatures and governmental agencies have started to develop
solutions toward producing more reliable evidence.
63
B. Analysis of Modern Due Process Protections
In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion mandates that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." In the context of a criminal defendant, the United
States Supreme Court has held "criminal prosecutions must comport with
prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this
standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."" The majority of the United States
Supreme Court's due process discussions in criminal prosecutions have focused
on police procedures used to identify a suspect or to extract confessions from
accused individuals. A common problem in suspect identification techniques has
been the suggestive lineup, often used at police stations. For example, a black
individual picked from a lineup comprised of one black and the rest whites
would be outrageously suggestive. Generally, courts have held a state may not
60. For excellent commentaries, see Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual
Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 181 (1985); James Selkin & Peter
G.W. Schouten, The Child Sexual Abuse Case in the Courtroom: A Source Book (James Selkin ed.,
1987); Younts, supra note 25; Dale, supra note 23. The factors most likely to result in unreliable
answers are: the presence of police officers, the use of excess leading questions and repeated
questions, the use of peer pressure, the use of promises, threats, praise or criticisms, and the failure
to control outside influences.
61. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379-80 (N.J. 1994).
62. Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 60, at 195.
63. One step taken by legislatures to protect defendants from unreliable child testimony is the
hearsay statute. For example, see State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 953 (Fla. 1994) (stating a
hearsay statute is one "enacted to enable trustworthy and reliable statements not covered under any
other hearsay exception"). Another protection is the pretrial reliability assessment. For example, the
Criteria-Based Content Analysis test provides a means to "evaluate the validity of the child's
statement by analyzing its content" before trial. Dale, supra note 23, at 200. Finally, various
governmental and psychological agencies have given guidelines for interviewers to use to obtain
valuable information. For example, see National Institute of Justice, New Approach to Interviewing
Children: A Test of Its Effectiveness, May (1992).
64. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984).
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"rely on an identification secured by a process in which the search for truth is
made secondary to the quest for a conviction."''
The scope of the Due Process Clause in criminal prosecutions, however, is
not restricted to identification of accused individuals. The protections run much
deeper. Fundamentally, the clause guarantees a defendant the right to a fair trial.
To maintain a claim of a due process violation, a defendant must prove some
form of wrongful government conduct. More specifically, the United States
Supreme Court has recently recognized "the settled law requiring some sort of
'state action' to support a claim of violation of the Due Process Clause."" If
the defendant makes a sufficient showing of impropriety, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment then imposes upon courts the duty to examine "the
whole course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses."67
In the context of criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court has employed the
Due Process Clause in two general areas: traditionally, in guaranteeing
defendants a fundamentally fair trial; and more specifically, in requiring
confession and identification evidence to meet certain standards of reliability.
1. Fairness
Perhaps the seminal case with respect to traditional criminal due process is
Rochin v. California." In Rochin, the Court explained that "[d]ue process of
law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal
immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' 69 Asserting that some police procedures "offend the commun-
ity's sense of fair play and decency,"7 the Court enunciated the "shock the
conscience test"" and overturned a drug conviction based on evidence obtained
through pumping the defendant's stomach against his will.
Twenty-five years later, the Court limited Rochin and the judiciary's
discretion in finding due process violations:" "[J]udges are not free, in
65. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1966).
66. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1986). This case involved
not an identification but a confession, which was claimed to be involuntary. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held "that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 167, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
67. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17, 65 S. Ct. 781, 789 (1945).
68. 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
69. Id. at 169, 72 S. Ct. at 208 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct.
330, 332 (1934)).
70. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173, 72 S. Ct. at 210.
71. Id. at 172, 72 S. Ct. at 209.
72. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977).
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defining 'due process,' to impose on law enforcement officials our 'personal and
private notions' of fairness and to 'disregard the limits that bind judges in their
judicial function. ' "" Rather, courts are limited to applying due process to
situations in which the procedures violate the community's sense of fairness in
judicial procedures.74
Additionally, the Supreme Court has extended due process to protect
defendants from overbearing governmental influence. In Chambers v. Florida,75
the Court asserted that the Due Process Clause "was intended to guarantee
procedural standards adequate and appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at
all times, people charged with or suspected of crime by those holding positions
of power and authority. '76 The Court concluded: "[t]he fundamental idea that
no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for
violation of that law until there had been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in
a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement and tyrannical power. 77
Recently, the Supreme Court has confirmed the idea that due process in criminal
prosecutions still exists to guarantee fairness in proceedings against the accused
at any stage, from arrest to investigation and trial.78
2. Reliability
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has included identifications and
confessions among those stages of a prosecution deserving of due process
protections. More specifically, the Court's decisions have culminated in a
requirement of reliability of the evidence that these prosecutorial devices
produce. Focus, therefore, has been on the factual surroundings of the
procedures at hand to ensure no improprieties existed, resulting in the wrong
person on trial. Because of the similarities of identification procedures to child
witness interviews, 79 an analysis of the identification and confession decisions
is proper at this point.
73. Id. at 790, 97 S. Ct. at 2049 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. 165, 170, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209).
74. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S. Ct. at 2049.
75. 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472 (1940).
76. Id. at 236, 60 S. Ct. at 477. The Court expressed disapproval of"[t]yrannical governments
[that] had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scape goats
of the weak." Id.
77. Id. at 236-37, 60 S. Ct. at 477.
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
79. Consider the analogies given by the Supreme Court of New Jersey: "The law governing
the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony provides a helpful perspective in addressing
the concerns at issue here .... Like the investigatory interview in a child sexual-abuse case, a
pretrial identification procedure can be a critical moment in the course of a criminal prosecution."
State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1382 (N.J. 1994) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
230, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932 (1967)). The court further noted that "the effects of an initially suggestive
identification, like those of a coercive or suggestive interrogation, are likely to remain corrosive over
time; that is, 'once the witness has picked out the accused ... he is not likely to go back on his word
later."' Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 229, 87 S. Ct. at 1933).
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The United States Supreme Court extended due process protections to
defendants identified in suggestive lineups in the landmark decision of Stovall v.
Denno. ° The Court cited due process as a "recognized ground of attack" in
suggestive identification cases, due to the risk of "irreparable mistaken
identification."'" The next major decision was Neil v. Biggers, 2 in which the
Court reaffirmed Stovall's due process implications and protections and laid out
guidelines for use in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification resulting from
suggestive confrontation procedures. 3
The most significant decision concerning the Due Process Clause in
identification proceedings, however, was the 1977 case of Manson v.
Brathwaite. Using the reasoning in Stovall and the factors in Biggers, the
Court provided the current rule on admissibility of tainted identifications. The
Court concluded "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony."" Using the Biggers factors to determine reliability
and weighing the result against "the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself,"8 6 the Court upheld .the conviction against a due process
challenge. The Court's analysis suggests that, regardless of the suggestive nature
of the identification techniques used, courts may admit identification evidence if
it is found to be reliable.
Many state and lower federal court decisions have applied and interpreted
the United States Supreme Court's identification due process decisions." The
underlying theme in these decisions is a strong reluctance to overturn convictions
by sustaining due process challenges.88 An argument exists that the Supreme
Court's decisions, culminating in Manson, have steadily decreased a defendant's
80. 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967).
81. Id. at 302, 87 S. Ct. at 1972.
82. 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972).
83. The factors listed in Biggers include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. at 199, 93 S.
Ct. at 382.
84. 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977). In this case, an undercover police officer purchased
heroin from a seller and then gave a description of the seller to another officer. The second officer
later left a single photo of the defendant in the office of the undercover officer. This photograph was
to be used to allow the undercover officer (the witness) to identify the seller of the heroin. Defendant
challenged the identification as being overly suggestive since the officer had only his picture from
which to choose his suspect.
85. Id. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253.
86. Id. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253.
87. For example, see Harris v. Wyrick, 644 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1981); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d
86 (N.J. 1981).
88. E.g., Harris, 644 F.2d at 710; United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016, 95 S. Ct. 2424 (1975); Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958, 94 S. Ct. 1975 (1973); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 216 (Va.
App. 1990).
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due process protections in criminal prosecutions."' The Manson rule tends to
admit nearly all evidence. With "reliability" being the only requirement, courts
have been able to look to any corroborating evidence." If evidence is found
to be reliable, then the suggestive procedure by which it was gathered becomes
irrelevant. This lesser standard of protection has allowed courts "to focus less
on the fairness of the pretrial procedures and more on the reliability of the
outcomes of those procedures."' One commentator has noted the current state
of due process in criminal identification cases: "[t]he lower courts have applied
the Stovall-Manson rule in a manner that routinely permits identifications secured
by all but the most outrageous procedures." 2
IV. DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS RAISED BY MICHAELS
A. Analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion
The Michaels court's discussion of the defendant's due process rights did not
go far enough with its reasoning. The New Jersey Supreme Court gave the
defendant the benefits of a successful due process challenge without expressly
89. For example, see David E. Paseltiner, Twenty-Years ofDiminishing Protection: A Proposal
to Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 583 (1987); Steven P. Grossman,
Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Process Test Fails to Meet Its Own Criteria,
11 U. Bait. L. Rev. 53 (1981).
90. A distinction must be drawn between corroborating evidence used to sustain a conviction
and corroborating evidence used to sustain a finding that a piece of testimony is reliable. A state
may introduce other evidence to sustain a conviction based on a suggestive identification. This is
the idea behind the harmless error and independent source doctrines. However, the Supreme Court
in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), held that corroborating evidence may not
be introduced to sustain a finding of reliability of a hearsay statement Such a statement "must
present inherent indicia of reliability before it may be admitted into evidence. Corroborative evidence
may not be considered in a trial court's initial d9termination of whether certain hearsay is reliable."
McGough, supra note 23, at 147. Thus, while other evidence may be introduced to corroborate a
conviction based in part on a suggestive identification, it may not be used to help sustain the
reliability of an out-of-court statement itself. In essence, the corroborating evidence must be enough
to render the substance of the statement reliable despite the suggestive procedure used.
91. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial
Identfication Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J. 259, 261-62 (1991). See also
Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1973) ("Due process does not require that every pretrial
identification of a witness must be conducted under laboratory conditions of an approved lineup.")
(citing United States v. Davis, 407 F.2d 846, 847 (4th Cir. 1969)).
92. Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem
of Crime Control, 94 Yale L.J. 315, 328 n.43 (1984). See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
89 S. Ct. 1127 (1969) for the only Supreme Court decision to reverse a conviction based on the
suggestiveness of a lineup. In Foster, the defendant was initially placed in a lineup with considerably
shorter men and, after no positive identification by the victim, was placed in a one-on-one
confrontation with the victim. The victim then only made a tentative identification. It was not until
a new lineup after the one-on-one confrontation in which the defendant was identified more
definitely.
LLOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
holding the clause to be applicable. The court recognized its duty "to ensure that
evidence admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of use to the
finder of fact who will draw the ultimate conclusions of guilt or innocence. '
This concern alone, according to the court, implicated constitutional due process.
The lack of explanation, however, decreases the strength of this reasoning.
The court did cite Manson as support for its position, but erroneously
interpreted its holding, stating, "[r]eliability is the linchpin in determining
admissibility of evidence."' While this assertion is a logical extension of the
Manson standard, it is not a part of the actual holding. This omission may have
been inadvertent, or the court may have tried to avoid a constitutional quandary.
Whatever the cause for error, the Stovall-Manson protections have been expressly
extended only to identification questions. Michaels, however, is not an
identification decision; it dealt instead with substantive evidence of guilt or
innocence. Thus, the New Jersey court's reliance on Manson, without further
clarification, is not an entirely satisfactory explanation for its holding.
B. Extending Due Process Protections to the Michaels-Type Defendant
The Due Process Clause should be extended to cases of suggestive or
coercive pretrial interviews of witnesses. This should be accomplished by the
government interviewers complying with the constitutional notions of fundamen-
tal fairness. Procedures should be instituted to minimize the possibility of a
person being wrongfully accused and thus denied a truly fair trial. As the
Michaels court explained, the Manson "reliability" rationale should apply.
Regardless of the suggestiveness of the interviews, evidence derived should be
admitted if it is found to be reliable, because reliable evidence can result in a fair
trial under the Manson due process rationale, and because of the similarities
between an identification procedure and a pretrial interview.
A concern underlying this due process extension, however, is the counter-
vailing interest of the criminal justice system and society in convicting the guilty.
Defendants should not escape an otherwise legitimate prosecution because of a
small mistake on the state's part. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Stone v. Powell,95 "[w]hile courts, of course, must ever be concerned with
preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as
a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."' The need to
preserve highly relevant evidence can be satisfied through a balancing test, as
delineated in Stone:
93. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1380 (N.J. 1994).
94. Id. at 1380 (emphasis added). The actual words of the United States Supreme Court were:
"reliability is the linchpin in determining admissibility of identification testimony." Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977) (emphasis added).
95. 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
96. Id. at 485, 96 S. Ct. at 3048.
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's usefulness in a
particular context was evident in Walder v. United States ... where the
Court permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to
impeach the credibility of a defendant who had testified broadly in his
own defense. The Court held, in effect, that the interests safeguarded
by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process. The
judgment in Walder revealed most clearly that the policies behind the
exclusionary rule are not absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in
light of competing policies.97
The same balancing test surrounding the exclusionary rule is applicable in
accusations of child sexual abuse. In extending the due process guarantees to
cases involving suggestive pretrial interviews of child witnesses, the same two
general categories of the Supreme Court decisions must be considered, namely
fundamental fairness and reliability.
1. Fairness
As in all criminal proceedings, the due process safety net protects a
defendant like Kelly Michaels throughout her trial. Just as in identification
cases, the Due Process Clause should also extend to pretrial procedures. Since
due process is used to ensure fairness to the accused in identification or
confession cases, it should also require fairness in the methods used to obtain
evidence from alleged victims of child abuse. There is judicial support for
extending the Due Process Clause to this stage of a criminal proceeding. The
United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton98 stated that "tactics for
eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional
boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental
fairness."" The Court further noted "certain interrogation techniques, either in
isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so
offensive to a civilized system ofjustice that they must be condemned under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 1
A due process fairness question clearly arises in the context of suggestive
interview techniques. Regardless of one's personal position on the degree of
tolerance for police impropriety, it is certain that improperly conducted child
interviews can result in unfairness to the accused individual. In applying the
97. Stone, 428 U.S. at 488, 96 S. Ct. at 3049 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74
S. Ct. 354 (1954)).
98. 474 U.S. 104, 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985).
99. Id. at 110, 106 S. Ct. at 449.
100. Id. at 109, 106 S. Ct. at 449.
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fairness notions to the Michaels case, the prerequisite of "some sort of 'state
action '" ' is clearly satisfied. 2
The next question to be asked is what degree of wrongful acts by the state's
agents should lead to a dismissal or reversal of a prosecution? The United States
Supreme Court answered this question in Stroble v. California:
When this Court is asked to reverse a state court conviction as wanting
in due process, illegal acts of state officials prior to trial are relevant
only as they bear on petitioner's contention that he has been deprived
of a fair trial, either through the use of a coerced confession or
otherwise.0 3
Even though the acts of the interviewers in Michaels would not rise to the
level of being "illegal," they did result in the defendant being deprived of a fair
trial. Minor uses of leading questions, for example, may not deprive a defendant
of a fair trial. But in Michaels' case, the degree of suggestive interviews and the
interviewers' clear impartiality bore very heavily on her fair trial rights-the
wrongful acts gave the state practically all of its evidence. Therefore, under
Stroble, all of the pretrial interview techniques used on the Wee Care children
would be relevant in a court's resolution of a due process challenge by Michaels.
Next, considering the New Jersey investigators' techniques in light of
traditional Supreme Court due process doctrine, a court would probably find a
violation of the Due Process Clause. Although no clear definition exists of "the
community's sense of fair play and decency" under Rochin, °4 or the "canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice" under Malinski v.
New York,'05 Michaels' situation should easily "shock the conscience,'" °
especially considering the public outrage over child sexual abuse. Many people
in- positions dealing with children-teachers, counselors, doctors, and the
like-would readily admit the fear of being wrongfully accused, as was
apparently the case with Kelly Michaels. Of course, a determination of fairness
will vary according to the specific facts. In a case as extreme as Michaels,
however, how could it be found fair? How can such procedures possibly
comport with the Due Process Clause requirements? Considering the plethora
of authority available on interviewing techniques for child witnesses, blatant
disregard of such techniques should be heavily disfavored.
What should a court do when there is adequate evidence to convict the
accused, besides the tainted interview evidence, yet the defendant claims a
101. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1986).
102. In Michaels, the interviewing detectives, as agents of the state, and their degree of
involvement would supply the "necessary predicate" of state action. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107
S. Ct. at 522.
103. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197, 72 S. Ct. 599, 607 (1952).
104. 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S. Ct. 205, 210 (1952).
105. 324 U.S. 401, 417, 65 S. Ct. 781, 789 (1945).
106. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. at 209.
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violation of due process rights because of that taint? Should a guilty criminal
have his case dismissed because of slight improper acts of the state's agents?
The vagueness of the "fairness" standard may suggest to courts that the
defendant's right to a fair trial has been fundamentally infected. This situation
would require an analysis similar to the Manson-line of decisions."
2. Reliability
If the analogy can be properly made, then the argument is Simple: if the
evidence derived from the witnesses, in this case the children, is deemed to be
reliable, then it should be admitted into trial despite the improper techniques
used to obtain it. This standard should be used only in cases where the state
impropriety is slight and the corroborating evidence substantial. In cases of
egregious disregard by the state agents, the fairness rationale should govern and
taint the whole prosecution. To determine admissibility, a balancing process
would be required. In close cases, the state's interest in prosecuting abusers
could outweigh any unfairness employed by the state, and the otherwise reliable
statements would become available.
The Michaels court's rationale that reliability should be the "linchpin" in
determining the admissibility of statements elicited from child witnesses should
be accepted. An analogy of a Michaels-type case to the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in its identification decisions is a proper beginning. This
rule of reliability in identification cases protects a defendant from the specific
risk of a misidentification. This risk can easily be analogized to that of a
wrongful accusation or wrongful conviction. The introduction of substantive
evidence of guilt, achieved through faulty interrogations from witnesses, threatens
the fairness of the trial as much or more than an improper identification
procedure."8 Thus, by excluding suggestive interview evidence if unreliable,
the same goal sought by the Stovall-Manson rationale would be achieved.
107. Recall that the Manson rule allows evidence from a suggestive identification procedure to
be admitted into evidence, notwithstanding the suggestiveness, if the evidence is reliable. It is
important to remember that reliability is required by Manson in an attempt to assure a fair trial,
because fairness is the underlying principle of the Due Process Clause in criminal proceedings.
Indeed, even the Manson Court noted that "[flaimess of the trial is threatened by suggestive
confrontation evidence ...." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (1977).
Fairness of the trial is even more threatened by admitting suggestive evidence relating to substantive
guilt or innocence. By using the Manson analogy in cases in which it would do injustice to the state
to dismiss the prosecution, the same goal of providing a fair trial would be achieved in situations
similar to that in Michaels.
108. Note the Michaels court's reasoning: "We are confronted in this case with pretrial events
relating not to the identification of an offender but, perhaps more crucially, to the occurrence of the
offense itself Those events-investigatory interviews-are fraught with the elements of untoward
suggestiveness and the danger of unreliable evidentiary results." State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372,
1382 (N.J. 1994) (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the pretrial identification of an accused and the pretrial
investigatory interviews of child witnesses can both produce effects that tend to
taint the whole course of the prosecution. It has been noted that "the interview-
ing process is also a learning process and can actually change what exists in the
child's memory. Once such a change takes place, it is virtually irreversible."' °
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court stated, relating to identification
procedures, "[m]oreover, '[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a
witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on
his word later on."'. 0 Thus, in both identification and pretrial interview cases,
the memories of the witnesses subjected to the improper procedures may be
fatally tainted. An extension of due process protections to the interview stage
of the prosecution would reduce this threat, as the protection has done in
identification cases.
Extending the protection would also serve the common goal, mentioned in
Biggers, of "deter[ring] the police from using a less reliable procedure where a
more reliable one may be available.""' Threatened with possible exclusion of
their main evidence, prosecutors will, at least, attempt to obtain more credible
testimony. This is especially true with a Michaels-type case in which children
are the only witnesses, and little or no corroborating evidence exists.
Another analogy from the Manson family of decisions relates to the Biggers
factors, and how they can be modified to a situation like Michaels."' The
factors, modified only slightly, could be as follows:
(1) the opportunity of the child to actually witness the events;
(2) the child's degree of attention;
(3) the accuracy of the child's prior description of the events;
(4) the level of certainty exhibited by the child; and
(5) the length of time between the crime and the interview.
Each modified factor would have to be viewed in light of the special consider-
ations due child witnesses. When taken in light of "all relevant circumstanc-
es '" 3 and weighed against the "corrupting effect"" 4 of the suggestive inter-
view itself, these factors could provide an adequate test for reliability.
Several lower federal and state court decisions also present justifications for
extending due process protections by requiring reliability of pretrial interview
evidence. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
109. Feher, supra note 23, at 232-33.
110. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 875 S. Ct. 1926, 1933 (1967) (alteration in
original) (citing Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part 1, 1963 Crim. L. Rev. 479,
482 (1963)).
111. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382 (1972).
112. See supra note 83.
113. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1381 (N.J. 1994). Other extremely valuable factors for
courts to consider were cited by the Michaels court. See supra note 48.
114. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977).
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Circuit expounded on the police deterrence goal in Solomon v. Smith.' The
court noted the right to due process "must encompass not only the right to avoid
improper police methods that suggest the initial identification, but as well the
right to avoid having suggestive methods transform a selection that was only
tentative into one that is positively certain."'"6  Logically then, due process
should also prevent transforming a slight or nonexistent belief in a child's mind
into one that the child really believes to be true.
In Smith v. Coiner,"7 the Fourth Circuit sustained a due process challenge
upon finding "the police were so certain that they had the real culprit that they
in effect had determined to make no further investigation.""' The Michaels
prosecutors acted in much the same way. Michaels was stigmatized from the
outset of the investigation as the culprit-no other possible defendants were
questioned. This narrow-minded approach was prevalent in the interviews and
led to the influenced nature of the children's responses. This interviewer bias
is another factor to be considered in the admissibility analysis.
Lower courts have also focusedmore on the actual suggestiveness employed
and less on the stage of the proceeding." 9 Prosecutorial conduct is becoming
a major concern,120 regardless of the stage of the prosecution. This suggests
due process protections are being extended beyond the courtroom to all pretrial
activities.
The "risk of misidentification" analogy is also given support in state court
decisions. In People v. Caruso, the Supreme Court of California sustained
a due process challenge to identification testimony derived from "circumstances
which could only have suggested ... that defendant was the man to be charged
with the offense."'" When interview procedures like those in Michaels are
used, the interviewers suggest to the children that the defendant is in fact guilty
and that they should respond accordingly. The tainted statements of the
witnesses are "essential to [the] defendant's conviction," so their admission
would constitute "prejudicial error."'2  Thus, a likelihood of wrongful
accusation or conviction relates well to the "irreparable mistaken identification"
rationale. 24
115. 645 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1981).
116. Id. at 1185.
117. 473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115, 94 S. Ct. 848 (1973).
118. Id. at 881.
119. For example, see Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1976): "The influence of
improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice
than any other single factor .... " Id. at 292 (citing Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases 26 (1971)).
120. See infra note 155.
121. 436 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1968).
122. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 341 n.2.
124. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972 (1967).
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Besides analogizing to fit the reliability rule within pretrial interviews of
children, specific support of the idea exists in judicial opinions and other written
authority. Two judges, although in dissent, recently argued strongly for
extending the reliability due process requirement to pretrial interviews. In State
v. Bullock,2 ' Justice Stewart of the Supreme Court of Utah attempted to
convince his colleagues of the fundamental unfairness and unreliability present
because of admitted testimony from suggestive interviews of the child witness.
Judge Stewart wrote:
The majority does not even address [the] point; but if it has merit, as
I believe it has, then this trial was in fact fatally infected with funda-
mental unfairness and cannot stand constitutionally ....
[S]ince [the social worker/interviewer's] techniques are so highly
unreliable and may have induced false testimony, this Court should
declare such techniques inappropriate and testimony elicited by them
inadmissible .... Once testimony is tainted, it is unlikely that the taint
can be excised, and convictions may have to be reversed that would not
have to be if the testimony were not tainted.'26
More directly on point is the dissent in United States v. Spotted War
Bonnet,' a decision that also involved questionable child interviews. Chief
Judge Lay, of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that "[a] serious
deprivation of the accused's right to due process has occurred in this case. The
defendant has been sentenced to prison for fifteen years on the most unreliable,
suggestive, and manipulated evidence contained in any record that I have ever
reviewed."'2 8 The judge made a direct analogy to identification cases: "In this
sense, this case is analogous to the scores of cases in which law enforcement
personnel have been found as a matter of law to have used improper suggestive
and manipulative techniques in order to attain sought-after identification."' 2 9
125. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990). The
interviewer in this case admitted that her "intervention with children is not from a neutral position,"
but rather as "a child's advocate." Id. at 156. The interviews she had with the children were not
recorded and were therefore attacked for an inability to challenge their objectivity. The defendant
presented expert witnesses, one of whom attacked the interviewer's techniques of "ignoring the
child's response until the child learned to give the answer she expected and of rewarding answers that
she liked by making such comments as 'good boy."' Id. at 157.
126. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
127. 882 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S. Ct. 3267 (1990), affid
on other grounds, 933 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1187 (1992).
128. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). The interviewers in this case were accused, among other
things, of influencing the answers of the alleged child victims by telling them that they would be
placed in a foster home if they failed to accuse their father of sexual abuse. Id. at 1366.
129. Id. at 1366. Chief Judge Lay also noted that "[o]nce it is demonstrated that an
unnecessarily suggestive confrontation has been used, testimony about that confrontation 'must be
excluded and the government then assumes the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that
the witness' in-court identification was not tainted by the suggestive confrontation."' Id. at 1364
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Thus, current judicial recognition exists that due process should extend to cases
involving child interviews.
At least one legal expert has recognized that this argument should be adopt-
ed. 3 °  Thomas C. Feher stated, "securing a criminal conviction through
testimony that is tainted by suggestion violates the due process clause of the
United States Constitution,''. although without an analogy to identification
cases. He also found no significant decisions directly on point, and thus analogy
to other prosecutorial conduct was necessary.' Feher analogized to Wade'33
and stated "[d]ue process requires that the State not convict a defendant upon
evidence which is the product of suggestion."'34 Although he conceded a lack
of judicial authority, Feher's analysis is very convincing:
Child witnesses are highly susceptible to suggestion and often undergo
severely suggestive interviews. It is hard to imagine that the testimony
of such a person could ever bear enough indicia of reliability as to not
violate due process.
Further, there seems to be no basis for limiting the use of these
standards to cases where the witness' testimony consists of an identifi-
cation. Wade and its progeny have provided guidance for the admissi-
bility determination to other types of testimony, and their logical
congruence to the situation at hand is too compelling to be ignored.'
Considering the above, the due process protections provided by Manson and
its predecessors, relating to the requirement of reliable identification evidence,
could be equally applied to a Michaels-type situation. If the testimony obtained
from child witnesses retains a level of credibility that it is deemed reliable, then
it should be admitted despite the suggestive interview techniques. This position
would be beneficial to those accused of child sex crimes in that proper interview
techniques would be demanded to maintain fairness. With the availability of
written material on proper interview techniques for child witnesses, the state has
guidance on how to avoid a due process challenge. Continued use of improper
techniques should suggest to courts that the information derived is tainted and
thus inadmissible. Finally, courts should keep in mind the countervailing
interests of the criminal justice system and factor the interests of society in
general into the due process consideration. 36
(citing Sanchell v. Parratt, 530 F.2d 286, 293 (8th Cir. 1976)).
130. Feher, supra note 23.
131. Id. at 249.
132. Id. at 249-50 n.160.
133. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967).
134. Feher, supra note 23, at 251.
135. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
136. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945), for a good balancing
determination: "we must be deeply mindful of the responsibilities of the States for the enforcement
of criminal laws, and exercise with due humility our merely negative function in subjecting
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C. Arguments Against the Extension of the Manson Reliability Rule
There are arguments that opponents of the above-mentioned Manson
reliability proposition may present. If any of them are accepted, and the
proposition thus denied, then the fundamental fairness rationale will still govern,
but without a pretrial reliability assessment. First, no express language exists
from Supreme Court decisions that warrants such an extension; the due process
reliability standard has been exclusively used with identifications. The response
to this contention is the analogies explained above. True, the Supreme Court has
not provided specific precedent, but its decisions provide ample justification for
the transition. Courts are free to employ their analytical reasoning skills to
decide res nova issues according to previous decisions.
Second, courts have been traditionally reluctant to sustain due process
challenges. Challenges have been decided in defendants' favor only in the most
egregious situations. Again, this policy should continue. All the proposed
extension would do is to provide a defendant in a proceeding involving child
witnesses with a last chance protection, exactly as courts have provided in the
past.
Third, some may argue that, because of the nature of the child's mind,
stronger tactics are necessary to elicit testimony at all. Thus states should not
be as threatened with exclusion as if adults were the witnesses. This argument
is faulty. It is true that some stronger tactics are needed on children to pierce
through the initial fear and uneasiness that children experience in pressure
situations and to reach their actual memory of the events; but, because of the
guidelines now provided to properly interview children, the interrogation
techniques are not required to be flagrant in order to access valuable and reliable
testimony. Therefore, as Mr. Feher argues, 37 it seems that no compelling
reasons exist for not extending due process to the interview stage of a Michaels
situation.
Colorado v. Connelly,3 ' however, presents a problem by supporting the
theory that reliability of the evidence is not the focus for a due process claim.
Connelly suggested that reliability has no place in a due process analysis. The
defendant in Connelly claimed his distorted mental state affected the voluntari-
ness of his confession. In deferring to the evidentiary rules of the trial forum,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the state
of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite
convictions from state courts to the very narrow scrutiny which the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes." Id. at 418, 65 S. Ct. 789-90. See also United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976): "Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the
exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its
proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence." Id. at 448-49, 96 S. Ct. 3029.
137. Feher, supra note 23, at 251.
138. 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
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divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the
State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be
resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence and erects
no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by one in the
condition of respondent might be proved to be quite unreliable, but this
is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum, ...
and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'39
Thus, by refusing to decide on the reliability of the confession evidence, the
Court may have precluded a Manson test for child interview evidence. An
evidentiary due process challenge would then be governed by the rules of the
trial court and not by the United States Constitution. This would leave a
defendant with only a "fundamental unfairness" constitutional challenge, as
Connelly still recognized.' On the other hand, the specific language that
Rehnquist used could limit the decision to defendant confessions. Identifications
and interrogation techniques have nothing to do with the mental state of the
defendant, as does a confession. They instead involve procedures employed by
state agents, evidence from which is susceptible to determinations of reliability.
This suggests that reliability could be the standard in cases of pretrial child
interviews, despite the effects of Connelly.
D. Harmless Error and Independent Source
In the event that due process arguments would be considered in a case like
Michaels, counterclaims of the state would undoubtedly arise to oppose the
assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. This would occur regardless of
which option is chosen to extend the protection: requiring fundamental fairness
throughout or requiring reliability of the child interview statements. The more
prominent of such claims would be harmless error 4' and independent source.
Almost thirty years ago, the Supreme Court announced the harmless error
standard. 2' The Court stated "there may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
139. Id. at 166-67, 107 S. Ct. at 521-22.
140. "The aim of the requirement of due process is... to prevent fundamental unfairness in the
use of evidence, whether true or false." Id. at 167, 107 S. Ct. at 522 (citing Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S. Ct. 280, 290 (1941)).
141. The main United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the harmless doctrine is
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), which noted that "the United States long
ago through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for
'errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."' Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at
827 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964)).
142. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18, 87 S. Ct. at 824. In this case the Court held that there was not
a harmless error when the state's prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to testify as being
inferences of their guilt, and when the trial court charged the jury that "it could draw adverse
inferences from petitioners' failure to testify." Id. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 825.
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may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction."' 43 The Court also established a test
for determining harmless errors: whether the court is "able to declare a belief
that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'1"
A defendant in the position of Kelly Michaels would not be subject to such
a rule, especially considering other language by the United States Supreme
Court: "[a]n error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly
influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ... be conceived of as
harmless.'" 4 If the defendant can show that "there is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction," then
the harmless error claim must be denied.'" The evidence complained of in
Michaels was almost exclusively what led to her conviction, so a harmless error
challenge would fail. But, in many other cases in which the state has sufficiently
strong corroborating evidence to support its case, the argument may have merit.
For example, in a case involving plenty of physical evidence or medical
testimony of abuse effects shown on the alleged victims, some degree of police
impropriety could reasonably be overlooked.
Closely related to the harmless error doctrine is the idea of independent
source' 47-applicable when the prosecution can show that the conviction was
based on totally unrelated and untainted evidence. The underlying idea of the
independent source rule is "the facts improperly obtained do not 'become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Govern-
ment's own wrong cannot be used by it' simply because it is used deriva-
tively.'
In the typical case involving a pretrial identification, the accused must first
demonstrate that the identification was tainted by suggestiveness. The burden
then shifts to the state to show an "independent source" for the identification.
Using the Biggers factors, the state usually focuses on the witness' opportunity
to view the accused at the crime scene. If the state can convince the trier of fact
that the identification at the scene was independent and untainted, then the
suggestive and tainted identification under police surveillance will be disregarded.
This analysis is consistent with the famous United States Supreme Court
exclusionary rule decision of Wong Sun v. United States,'49 which asks
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
143. Id. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
144. Id. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
145. Id. at 23-24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
146. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230 (1963).
147. The two main independent source decisions are United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87
S. Ct. 1926 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967).
148. Nardonne v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268 (1939) (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183 (1920)).
149. 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).
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instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'
u5 0
In the Michaels context, because of the lack of any other evidence, the
independent source would have to be the child's independent memory of the
alleged events. That is, evidence employed to charge and convict the defendant
must be shown to derive from an independent and untainted source. The Wong
Sun test Would have to be met for the evidence not to be subjected to the
exclusionary rule. Prosecutors, however, would face a formidable challenge to
show an independent source. Studies show that once a child's memory is
implanted with ideas different from his original ones, the taint is irreparable.'
Thus, prosecutors dealing with suggestive child interviews would normally not
have the advantage of this exception to the exclusionary rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional due process protections should extend beyond pretrial
identifications to protect defendants from testimony derived from unfair pretrial
interviews and interrogatories. This is especially true if the interviewee is a
child, as shown by the outlandish miscarriage of justice displayed by the New
Jersey prosecution team in Michaels.
The underlying principle of the argument to allow a due process claim is
best described by the Supreme Court's language in Chambers v. Mississippi:
52
"[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."'
153
Fairness to the accused should govern the interviews of alleged child victims of
sexual abuse. Indeed, even in Manson, the Court noted, "[t]he standard, after all,
is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 54 Courts should recognize that suggestive and coercive pretrial
interviews are subject to a due process "fairness" claim, and exclude this
evidence, especially in cases of obvious and egregious prosecutorial abuses.
55
150. Id. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (citing John MacArthur Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).
151. See McGough, supra note 23, at 73, 204-05; Montoya, supra note 23, at 936-37; Feher,
supra note 23, at 230-33.
152. 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973).
153. Id. at 294, 93 S. Ct. at 1045.
154. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (1977).
155. There are examples of State court decisions in which due process was held to be violated
as a result of prosecutorial misconduct other than suggestive identifications. For example, see State
v. Leadingham, 438 S.E.2d 825 (W. Va. 1993). Due process was held to be violated when police
and prosecutors used an undercover informant to penetrate a psychiatric institution in order to elicit
incriminating statements from a State court defendant undergoing a court-ordered psychiatric
evaluation. The court held that "when the State's action in obtaining incriminating evidence against
a defendant is overzealous or outrageous and infringes upon a defendant's constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment .. , due process and fundamental fairness preclude the State from using
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Where slight impropriety exists and sufficient evidence from other sources is
available to substantiate the allegations, the reliability standard from Manson may
be used. This standard would satisfy the interests of the state in prosecuting
criminals despite improprieties that do not impinge upon the truth-finding
function of trials. These solutions are reasonable, considering not only the need
to stop child sexual abuse, but also the need to avoid untrue or exaggerated
allegations. 56  The Due Process Clause offers the most cogent reason to
address this problem, because "in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals
as from the actual criminals themselves."
57
Clifton M Dugas, II
such evidence against the defendant." Id. at 834. Also, the Supreme Court of Nevada in State v.
Babayan, 787 P.2d 805 (Nev. 1990), agreed with the trial court that "portions of the prosecution's
presentations before the grand jury were deficient and denied respondent Babayan due process of
law .... " Id. at 818. However, the court dismissed the case without prejudice, thus allowing a
retrial.
156. Additionally, there is no basis for limiting this protection to cases involving child witnesses.
That is, prosecutors should be required to act with the same fairness when interviewing adult
witnesses. However, because adults do not have the same fragile and suggestive mentality as
children, the argument would be more difficult to make.
.157. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 1206 (1959).
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